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Abstract. Researchers on artificial intelligence have achieved human-
level intelligence in large-scale perfect-information games, but it is still
a challenge to achieve (nearly) optimal results (in other words, an ap-
proximate Nash Equilibrium) in large-scale imperfect-information games
(i.e. war games, football coach or business strategies). Neural Fictitious
Self Play (NFSP) is an effective algorithm for learning approximate Nash
equilibrium of imperfect-information games from self-play without prior
domain knowledge. However, it relies on Deep Q-Network, which is off-
line and is hard to converge in online games with changing opponent
strategy, so it can’t approach approximate Nash equilibrium in games
with large search scale and deep search depth. In this paper, we pro-
pose Monte Carlo Neural Fictitious Self Play (MC-NFSP), an algorithm
combines Monte Carlo tree search with NFSP, which greatly improves
the performance on large-scale zero-sum imperfect-information games.
Experimentally, we demonstrate that the proposed Monte Carlo Neu-
ral Fictitious Self Play can converge to approximate Nash equilibrium in
games with large-scale search depth while the Neural Fictitious Self Play
can’t. Furthermore, we develop Asynchronous Neural Fictitious Self Play
(ANFSP). It use asynchronous and parallel architecture to collect game
experience. In experiments, we show that parallel actor-learners have a
further accelerated and stabilizing effect on training.
Keywords: Approximate Nash Equilibrium · Imperfect-Information Games
· Monte Carlo Neural Fictitious Self-Play · Reinforcement Learning
1 Introduction
With rapid develop of deep reinforcement learning, AI already beats human
expert in perfect-information games like Go. However, researchers haven’t make
same progress in imperfect games like Starcraft or Dota. In order to guarantee
effectiveness of our model, we’d better to evaluate training and results in a
theorical and quantitive way, but we always neglect it.
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Game theory[14] is the cornerstone of human behavior patterns in real world
competitions. It studies how agents can maximize their own interests through
competition and cooperation, and can measure the quality the decisions in game.
It has become an attractive research task in computer science, the intersection
research topic called ”algorithmic game theory” has established[8], and gets more
and more interact with the development of artificial intelligence[17,1]. Its main
motivation is to make realworld complext problems, like transaction and traffic
control, work in practice.
In Game theory, Nash Equilibrium[14] would be an optimal solution in games,
i.e. no one can gain extra profit by alleviating their policy. Fictitious play[2] is
a traditional algorithm for finding Nash Equilibrium in normal-form imperfect
games. Fictitious players repeatedly choose best response to the opponent’s av-
erage strategy. The average strategy of players would converge to Nash Equilib-
rium. Heinrich et al.[5] proposed Extensive Fictitious Play, extending the idea
of fictitious play to extensive-form games. However, the states is represented in
the form of look-up table in each tree node, so that the generalization train-
ing (of similar states) would be unpractical; And the update of average policy
needs the traverse of the whole game tree which results in dimension disaster for
large games. Fictitious Self-Play(FSP)[6] addresses these problems by introduc-
ing samplebased machine learning approach. The approximation of best response
is learned by reinforcement learning and the update of average strategy is pro-
cessed by sample-based supervised learning. However, due the sampling control,
the interaction between agents is controlled by a central controller.
Heinrich and Silver [6] introduced Neural Fictitious Self-Play(NFSP), which
combines FSP with neural network function approximation. A player is consisted
of Q-learning network and supervised learning network. The algorithm calculates
a ”best response”,by greedy deep Q-learning, as well as an average strategy
by supervised learning of agents’ history behaviors. It solves the coordinated
problem by introducing anticipatory dynamics players behaves according to
a mixture of their average policy and best response. It’s the first end-to-end
reinforcement learning method which learns approximate Nash Equilibrium in
imperfect games without any prior knowledge.
However, NFSP has bad performance in games with large-scale search space
and search depth, because the nature that opponents’ strategy is complex and
DQN learns in an offline mode. In this paper, we propose Monte Carlo Neu-
ral Fictitious Self Play(MC-NFSP). Our algorithm combines NFSP with Monte
Carlo Tree Searches[4]. We evaluate our method in various two-player zero-sum
games. Experimentally we show that MC-NFSP would converge to approximate
Nash Equilibrium in Othello while NFSP can’t.
Another drawback is in NFSP the calculation of best response relies on Deep
Q-learning, which takes a long time to run until convergence. In this paper, we
propose Asynchronous Neural Fictitious Self-Play(ANFSP), which uses parallel
actor learners to stabilize and speed up training. Multiple players choose actions
in parallel, on multiple copies of the environment. Players share Q-learning net-
work and supervised learning network, accumulate gradients over multiple steps
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in Q-learning and calculate gradients of mini-batch in supervised learning. This
reduces the data storage memory needed compared to NFSP. We evaluate our
method in two-player zero-sum poker games. We show that the ANFSP can
approach approximate Nash Equilibrium more stable and quickly compared to
NFSP.
In order to show the effect of the advantage of the techniques of MC-NFSP
and ANFSP in more complex game, we also evaluated the effectiveness in a
FPS team combat game, in which an AI agent team fights with a human team,
and our system provided good tactic strategies and control policies to our agent
team, and help it to beat humans.
2 Background
In this section we briefly inroduce: related game theory concepts, current AI
systems for games, relationship between reinforcement learning and Nash Equi-
librium, and finally the Neural Fictitious Self Play (NFSP) techniques. For a
better introduction we refer the reader to[21,13,6]
2.1 Related Game Theory Concepts
Game in Study. In this paper, we mainly research on two-player imperfect-
information zero-sum game. A zero-sum game is a game in which the sum of each
player’s payoff is zero, and an imperfect-information game is a game in which
each player only observes partial game state. For example, Texas Hold’em, real-
time strategy games and FPS games. Such game is often represented in ”Normal
form”. Normal form is a game representation schema, which lists payoffs that
players get as a function of their actions by way of a matrix. In our studied games,
players take actions simultaneously. The goal of each player is to maximize their
own payoff in the game. Assume pii(a|U i) is the action distribution of player i
given the information set U i he observes, pi = (pi1, ..., pin) refers to the strategy
set of all players, Σi is the behavior set of player i, pi−i is the strategy set in pi
except pii, Ri(pi) is the expected payoff the player i gained following strategy pi
in game. The -best responses of player i to opponent’s strategy pi−i,
BRiε
(
pi−i
)
=
{
pii ∈ Σi : Ri (pii, pi−i) ≥ maxpi′∈ΣiRi (pii, pi−i)− }
contains all strategies whose payoff against pi−i that is suboptimal by no more
than .
Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium refers to the strategy that satisfies
any player in the game can’t obtain higher profit by changing his own strategy
when the others don’t change their strategy. Nash proved that if we allow mixed
strategies, then every game with a finite number of rational players that choose
from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Exploitability evaluates the distance between a strategy and Nash equilib-
rium strategy, which can be measured from the strategy profits of both side. For
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two-player zero-sum games, policy pi is exploitable by  if and only if
ε =
R1
(
BR1
(
pi2
)
, pi2
)
+R2
(
pi1,BR2
(
pi1
))
2
In the equation above, R1
(
BR1
(
pi2
))
is the profit(reword) of player1 by
making best response to his opponent. It is obvious that an exploitability of ε
yields at least an ε-approximate Nash Equilibrium (distance to Nash Equilib-
rium no larger than ε), becuase exploitability measures how much the opponent
can benefit from a player’s failure to adopt a Nash Equilibrium strategy. Nash
Equilibrium is unexploitable, i.e. exploitability is 0.
2.2 Reinforcement learning and Nash Equilibrium
Reinforcement learning agents learn how to maximize their expected payoff dur-
ing the interaction with the environment. The interaction can be modelled as
Markov Decision Process(MDP). At time step t, agent observes current envi-
ronment state St and selects an action at according to policy pi , where pi is
a mapping from state to action. In return, agent receives reward rt and next
environment state St+1 from environment.The goal of agent is maximizing the
accumulated return Gt =
∑∞
k=0 γ
krt+k for each state St with discount factor
γ ∈ (0, 1]. The action-value function Qpi(s, a) = E [Rt|st = s, a] defines the ex-
pected gain of taking action a in state s. It’s the common objective function for
most reinforcement learning.
An agent is learning on-policy if the policy it learns is what it currently
follows, otherwise it’s learning off-policy. Deep Q-learning[11] is an off-policy
method which aims to update the action-value function Q toward the one step
return. Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm[4] is an on-policy method which
aims to choose the best-response action by simulating the game according to
policy pi and updates the action-value function Q till the episode ends. Asyn-
chronous Deep Q-learning[10] is a multi-threaded asynchronous variant of Deep
Q-learning. It uses multiple actor-learners running in parallel on multiple copies
of the environment. Agents share Q-learning network and apply gradient updates
asynchronously.
The relationship between reinforcement learning (RL) solution and Game
Theory or Nash Equilibrium is: 1) MDP/RL adopts differential learning mecha-
nism, which theoretically achieves Bellman optimality (or Markov perfect equi-
librium, a refinement of the concept of Nash equilibrium), so it can learn the
subgame optimization substructure including Nash Equilibrium; 2) However, in
practice it’s very difficult to measure how near a trained strategy to a Nash
Equilibrium in large scale games, due to the cost in training.
2.3 Modern RL systems for games
In these years, reinforcement learning has great breakthrough in more complex
games. The most significant is the DeepMind AlphaGo[18] and AlphaZero[19]
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which beated world champions in the game Go. AlphaGo is initialized with
human anotated training datas, after achieved certain levels, it improves itself
by RL and self-play. AlphaZero can teach itself the wining strategy by playing
the game purely with itself using a Monte Carlo search tree. DeepMind has
shown the effectiveness of Monte Carlo techniques in games, but the game Go
is a sequential perfect-information game.
Recently, RL has more researches on imperfect-information games. StarCraft
is a hot point of research, many researches like CommNet[20] and BicNet[15]
focus on small map combat, and DeepMind’s AlphaStar[22] can play a whole
game, and has defeated top human players. The AlphaStar used the supervised
training with human data at first, then use a group of agents (league) play with
each other in RL to improve to superhuman level, but its current performance
is still not stable enough. So it is valuable to think about whether we can get
some tools in game theory to measure and control quality of trained strategy,
e.g. Nash Equilibrium.
In the study of AI for Poker games, researches often consider Nash Equi-
librium. In 2014, Heinrich and Silver of University College London proposed
a SmoothUCT algorithm[7] that combines the Monte Carlo tree search, con-
verges to approximate Nash equilibrium, and wins three silver medals in the
annual Computer Poker Contest (ACPC). In 2015, Lisy` et al. developed an on-
line Counterfactual regret minimization algorithm[9], which can be used to solve
Nash Equilibrium in the upper limit betting Texas Hold’em. The artificial intel-
ligence based on this algorithm Cepheus is a near perfect player, human In the
long run, the result can only be a tie, or the computer wins. In 2016, Heinrich
and Silver proposed the Neural Fictitious Self-Play algorithm, which approxi-
mates the Nash equilibrium of imperfect information games without any prior
knowledge. 2017 Carnegie Mellons artificial intelligence ”Libratus”[3] defeated
top Texas Hold’em players in one-on-one No-Limit Hold’em, and Libratus devel-
oped a balanced game to bring the strategy to Nash equilibrium. Also in 2017,
Moravcˇ´ık et al. proposed DeepStack[12], which also defeeted professional human
players, and it use exploitability to measure their results.
2.4 Neural Fictitious Self Play
Neural Fictitious Self-Play[6] is a model of learning approximate Nash Equilib-
rium in imperfect-information games. The model combines fictitious play with
deep learning. At each iteration, players determine best response to others’
average strategy with DQN and update their average strategy by supervised
learning. The state-action pair (St, at) is stored in supervised learning memory
only when player determines action from best response. The transition tuple
(St, at, St+1, rt) is stored in reinforcement learning memory whichever the policy
player follows when taking action. NFSP updates the average strategy network
with cross entropy loss L1,and updates the best response network with mean
squared loss L2.
L1
(
θΠ
)
= E(s,a)∼MSL [− logΠ(s, a|θΠ)]
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L2
(
θQ
)
= E(s,a,r,s′)∼MRL
[(
r + max
a′
Q
(
s′, a′|θQ′
)
−Q(s, a|θQ)
)2]
.
NFPS use an off-policy methods DQN in it, so it has problems in on-policy
games like RTS where we need to sample opponents’ changing strategy while we
play, and enumerating opponents’ strategy is too costly. As shown in Figure 1,
we compared the training efficiency of FP and NFSP, subfigures a) and b) show
in the game ”Matching Pennies”, FP converges in 200 iterations, but NFSP in
more than 3,000. And in the game ”Rock-Paper-Scissors”, NFSP converges in
more than 10,000 iterations as subfigures c) and d) show.
Fig. 1. Training Efficiency of FP and NFSP
3 Monte Carlo Neural Fictitious Self Play
3.1 Network Overview
The Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm uses a policy network to gen-
erate an action probability, and uses a value network to evaluate the value of
a state, so it doesn’t suffer the complexity in DQN to score each action under
each state. So MCTS can be used in high-dimensional and continuous problems.
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Moreover, MCTS directly uses reward that the player gets after each game to
train its networks, it can avoid the inaccurate problem of DQN to evaluate Q-
value (Q(st+1, a|θ′)) in the early stages. So we combines MCTS and NFSP to
propose a new algorithm more suitable to larger imperfect games.
Our aogorithm is called Monte Carlo Neural Fictitious Self Play (MC-NFSP),
it learns best response to opponents’ average strategy by Monte Carlo Tree
Search and updates average strategy by supervised learning with collected best
response history. The training dataset is generated from self-play in MC-NFSP.
Agent plays a mixture of best response and average strategy as NFSP. Most of
time they play an average strategy to the policy p′ , but with some probability(η =
0.1) they play a best response to MCTS.
The algorithm makes use of two neural networks: a policy-value network
for Monte Carlo Tree Search (i.e. best-response network), a policy network for
supervised learning (i.e. average-policy network). The best-response network is
shown in Figure. 2. The input is board state. The network has two outputs: a
policy p, which is a mapping from current state to action probability, and a value
v in [0, 1], which is the predicted value of the given state. In our network, relu
activation is used in convolution layers; dropout used in fully connection layers
to reduce overfitting; and for policy probability, softmax is used. The average-
policy network is almost same with best-response ntework except that it only
outputs a policy p′ (no value output), which represent the average policy of
player.
Fig. 2. Best Response Network for MCTS
3.2 Algorithm Training
The networks are trained along with the game self-play. The self-player adopts
a mixed policy: σ = (1− η)Π + ηB. In each action, the player chooses to use the
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result from best-response network-based MCTS, or from average-policy network,
with a probalilities η, 1− η.
In MCTS, the algorithm plays a modified Monte Carlo Tree Search(MCTS)
algorithm to calculate best response in current state. In MCTS, a tree node is
a state, and a edge is an action. MCTS simulates the future plays by adding
possible future actionss after an action is executed. At each time, agent chooses
action a maximizing U(s, a).
U(s, a) = Q(s, a) + cput · P (s, a) ·
√
N(s)
1 +N(s, a)
Q(s, a) is the expected payoff taking action a in state s, P (s, a) is probability of
taking action a from state s according to the best-response network. N(s) is the
number of visits to state s across simulation. N(s, a) counts the number of times
action a been chosen at state s across simulation, cput is a hyperparameter that
controls the degree of exploration. Agent takes action a and reaches next state
s′. If s′ is the terminal state, then the player’s final score (win or loss) is used
as the node score. If it is not, the opponent takes actions. When a node has not
been visited before, when adding it to the game tree, its P ,Q value is calculated
using best-response network as initial node value.
Node value V is propagated along the path visited in current simulation and
used to update corresponding Q(s, a) value.
Q(s, a) = (N(s, a) ∗Q(s, a) + V )/(N(s, a) + 1)
After multiple simulations, the N(s, a) values are a better approximation for
the policy. N(sb)∑
b(N(s,b)
is normalized as the improved policy pi(s). Agent picks an
action by sampling from the pi(s). After an episode, tuples (s,pi(s), v) are stored
in reinforcement learning memory to train best response network. Pairs (s,pi(s))
are stored in supervised learning memory to train average strategy network.
After a certain number of episodes, the best response network is trained with
loss l1 (in our loss functions, st is current game states, pt is the output of the
average network, zt is the result of the game, value is 1 or -1), the average
strategy network is trained with loss l2.
l1 = −
∑
t
(
pit log pt − (v (st)− zt)2
)
l2 = −
∑
t
pit log pt
Algorithm 1 MC-NFSP algorithm
1: InitializeΓ ,execute function InitGame(), RunAgent(Π,B);
2: function InitGame()
3: Initialize policy-value network B(s|θB) randomly
4: Initialize policy network Π(s|ΘΠ) randomly
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5: Initialize experience replay MRL and MSL
6: (players share networks B and Π)
7: end function
8: function RunAgent()
9: for each iteration do
10: its := its + 1
11: policy σ ←
{
B, with probability η
pi, with probability 1− η
12: observe initial state s and reward r
13: while not terminal do:
14: If policy comes from pi,choose action a in state st according to pi
15: If policy comes from B, choose action according to adapted MCTS
16: Execute action a, observe next state st+1
17: if terminal then:
18: store (st,pit, Zt) in MRL, store (st,pit) in MSL if policy comes
from B
19: end if
20: end while
21: if its%update == 0 then:
22: update best response network with l = −∑t (pit log pt − (v (st)− zt)2)
23: update average network with l = −∑t pit log pt
24: end if
25: end for
26: end function
3.3 Experiment
We compare MC-NFSP with NFSP in Othello. Our experiment investigate the
convergence of MC-NFSP to Nash equilibrium in Othello and measure the ex-
ploitability of learned strategy as comparative standard. To reduce the calcula-
tion time of exploitability, we choose 4× 4 Othello board.
Othello The neural network in MC-NFSP takes the 4×4 board position st as in-
put and passes it through two convolutional layers and a flatten layer. Then, the
resultant 120 dimensional vector is passed through many fully connected layers,
and output both a vector p, representing a probability distribution over moves,
and a scalar value v, representing the probability of the current player winning in
position st ,for best response network. The architect of average strategy’s neural
network is same as best response’s neural network except the output. It only
outputs a vector p representing probability distribution over moves for average
strategy network. We set the sizes of memory to 4M and 400K for MRL and MSL
respectively. MRL was updated with a circular buffer containing recent training
experiences, MSL was updated with reservoir sampling [23] to ensure an even
distribution of training experiences. The reinforcement learning and supervised
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learning rate were set to 0.01 and 0.005, and both used Adam optimizer. Players
perform gradient update every 100 episodes of play. MC-NFSP’s anticipatory
parameter was set to η = 0.1.
Comparison MC-NFSP with NFSP The neural network in NFSP is the
same with MC-NFSP’ except the output. The output of best response network
in NFSP is a vector Q, representing the value of each action in state st. The
output of average strategy network is a vector p, representing the probability
distribution over moves for average strategy network. We set the size of memory
to 400w and 40w for MRL and MSL respectively. The reinforcement learning
and supervised learning rate were set 0.01 and 0.005. Each player performed
gradient updates of mini-batch size 256 per network for every 256 moves. The
target network of best response network was refitted every 300 training. NFSP’s
anticipatory parameter was set to η = 0.1. The -greedy policy’s exploration
rate started at 0.6 and decayed to 0, proportionally to the inverse square root
of the number of iterations.
Figure 3.2 shows NFSP can’t approach Nash equilibrium in Othello. The
exploitability of strategy oscillates during the training time. The reason about
NFSP doesn’t converge to approximate Nash equilibrium in Othello is NFSP
players rely on Deep Q-learning approximating best response, which don’t have
good performance in scenes with large-scale search space and depth.
Fig. 3. Compare MC-NFSP and NFSP in Othello
4 Asynchronous Neural Fictitious Self Play
4.1 Algorithm Overview
Based on MC-NFSP, we further improve the time-efficiency by proposing a multi-
thread learnig mechanism called Asynchronous Neural Fictitious Self-Play(ANFSP),
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which asynchronously runs multiple players in parallel instances of the game en-
vironment. Players run different exploration policies in different threads, and
share the nerual network and performs gradient update asynchronously.
Inspired with A3C algorithm, our algorithm also starts multi-threads of plays,
as Algorithm 2 shows. In each thread, an MC-NFSP players a mixture of average-
policy and best-response networks. The state-action pair (St, at) is stored in
supervised learning memory only when the player determine action from best
response. Each thread computes gradient of best response network using tran-
sition tuple (St, at, St+1, rt) each step and accumulate gradients over multiple
timesteps to certain number before they are applied, which is similar to mini-
batches. And we compute gradient of average strategy network using mini-batch
of supervised learning memory after multiple timesteps after accumulated to
certain number. After a global counter achieves certain count, the networks are
updated. The loss of best response network is defined as l1, and the loss of
average strategy network is defined as l2.
l1 = −
(
r + γmaxa′Q
(
s′, a′; θQ
−)−Q (s, a; θQ))2
l2 = −
∑
i
ai log (Π (pi|s))
Algorithm 2 Asynchronous-Neural-Fictitious-Self-Play
1: InitGame(), Init game Γ , execute multiple thread RunAgent()
2: function InitGame()
3: Init average strategy network Π(s, a|θΠ)
4: Init Q-value network Q(s, a|θQ)
5: Init target network θQ
′ ← θQ
6: Init global anticipatory parameter η
7: Init global count T = 0
8: Init global iteration count iterations = 0
9: return
10: end function
11: function RunAgent()
12: Init thread count t← 0
13: repeatFor each iteration
14: policyσ ←
{
− greedy(Q), with probability η
Π, with probability 1− η
15: observe state s and reward r
16: determine action a, observe reward rt+1, next state st+1
17: y =
{
r
r + γmaxa′Q
(
s′, a′; θ−
)
, if st+1 is not terminal
18: accumulate gradient dθQ ← dθQ + ∂(y−Q(s,a;θ
Q))
2
dθQ
19: If policy σ comes from − greedy(Q), store pair (st, at) in
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20: st ← st+1
21: T ← T + 1
22: t← t+ 1
23: if T mod Itarget == 0 then
24: update target network θQ
′ ← θQ
25: end if
26: if s is terminal then
27: iterations += 1
28: if iterations mod IAsyncupdate == 0 then
29: update θQ with dθQ asynchronously
30: update θΠ with L
(
θΠ
)
= E(s,a)∼MSL [− logΠ(s, a|θΠ)]
31: dθQ ← 0, dθΠ ← 0
32: end if
33: end if
34: until T > Tmax
35: return
36: end function
4.2 Experiment
Leduc Hold’em We compare ANFSP with NFSP in modified two-player Leduc
Hold’em. For simplification, we limit the maximum bet size each round in Leduc
Hold’em is 2. In the game, the bet history is represented as a tensor with 4
dimensions, namely players, round, bet, action taken. Leduc Hold’em contains 2
rounds. Players usually have three actions to choose from, namely fold, call, raise.
As the game ends once a player gives up, then the betting history is represented
as a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 tensor. We flatten the 4-dimensional tensor to a vector of
length 16. Leduc Hold’em has a card deck of 6 cards. We represent each rounds
cards by a k-of-n encoding. E.g. LHE has a card vector of 6 cards and we set
public cards to 1, the rest to 0. Concatenating with the cards input, we encode
the information state of LHE as a vector of length 22.
We started 4 threads with exploration rate randomly chosen from [0.4, 0.6, 0.5, 0.7].
The exploration rate decayed to 0, proportionally to the inverse square root of
the number of iterations. We set the sizes of MSL to 200w. We train network
every 32 iterations of play. We update Deep Q-learning network with accumu-
lated gradients, and update average strategy network with mini-batch size of
128. The reinforcement learning and supervised learning rate were set 0.01 and
0.005, and both used SGD. The target network of Deep Q-learning was updated
every 50000 actions. ANFSP’s anticipatory parameter was set to η = 0.1.
Figure 4.1 shows ANFSP approaching Nash equilibrium in modified Leduc
Hold’em. The exploitability declined continually and appeared to stabilize at
around 0.64 after 140w episodes of play. The training costed about 2 hours.
Comparison with NFSP The architecture of neural network in NFSP is the
same with ANFSP’s. We set the size of memory to 20w and 200w for MRL
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and MSL respectively. The reinforcement learning and supervised learning rate
were set 0.01 and 0.005. Players performed gradient updates of mini-batch size
128 per network for every 128 actions. The target network of best response
network was refitted every 300 training. NFSP’s anticipatory parameter was set
to η = 0.1. The -greedy policy’ exploration rate started at 0.06 and decayed to
0, proportionally to the inverse square root of the number of iterations.
Figure 4.2 shows the learning performance of NFSP. The exploitability of
strategy fluctuated and appeared to stablize at around 0.75 after 70w episodes
of play. The training also costed about 2 hours. It means in same training time
(2 hours), ANFSP can complete more episodes and achieve better results (lower
exploitability).
Fig. 4. Compare ANFSP and NFSP in modified Leduc Hold’em
5 Evaluation in First Player Shooting Game
5.1 Experiment Setting
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm in a complex imperfect-
information game, we tried to train it in an FPS game and make it combats
with human-bings. The FPS platform used in this experiment is designed by
our research team. The game scene is an offensive and defensive confrontation
of two teams (10 VS 10). In training, one side is the MC-NFSP, the other side is
a memory trained by thousands of human plays (SL-Human). The experiment
was performed in a fixed closed 255 x 255 square map. The entire map was
divided into 12 x 12 areas each with a 20 x 20 square. The detail of the scene
is shown below (Figure. 5). All the green areas in Figure. 5 are passible regions,
and the gray areas are obstacles that cannot be crossed (rock or fence). Figure 5)
is marked with two points A, B, which are the birth points of the two teams. In
addition, the ninea reas marked with red represent the destination areas that an
agent can choose to affend or defend. The centers of the four walls respectively
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correspond to four doors. The size of the doors is limited to 2-3 people at the
same time. The team outside has a mission to break into the walls and kill all
of the inside ones, and the inside team is to defense.
Fig. 5. FPS Game Environment
5.2 Experiment
In training, each team is represented as a player. The states is a dictionary of
the form {L,CT,L,t, BT ′,L,t}, where L is the location block in game map, CT,L,t
means the number of current trained team T in L in time t, and BT ′,L,t is the
believed number of team T ′ in location L. The actions of a team is the force
assignment of number of fighters to different locations like < nf , L1, L2 >, which
means to assign nf fighters from L1 to L2. For reward, each fighter in team has a
health of 100, so the reward of team T is LostHealthT −LostHealthT ′. Different
with our previous works in this paper, the two networks are built and trained
for both the outside team and inside team. Figure 6 shows the training result
of the outside team (results of inner team is similar). We can see the training
converges very fast (in no more than 150 episode, each episode has 5 games).
The win rate of the outside team against the SL-Human gets higher than 80%,
and the loss of training gets near to zero.
After training, we make this algorithm to play the game with pure 10 col-
lege students, it plays with one human for 10 rounds (after five rounds, they
change the location), totally 100 games are played, in which our trained algo-
rithm achieved 75 victories, so it is a superhuman result.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the original NFSP algorithm that can learn approximate
Nash equilibrium in two-player imperfect-information games, and propose our
MC-NFSP and ANFSP algorithms. MC-NFSP use MCTS to help NFSP get rid
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Fig. 6. Evaluation in FPS Game
of offline DQN, so it achieves high improvement on training efficiency, and has
approached one more step to achieve approximate Nash equilibrium in larger-
scaled imperfect games with wider and deeper game tree. Experiment on Othello
shows players’ strategy converges to approximate Nash equilibrium with the
improved algorithm running a certain round, where the original algorithm cannot
converge. ANFSP uses asynchronous and parallel architecture to collect game
experiences efficiently and reduces converging time and memory cost that NFSP
needed. Experiment on modified Leduc Holdem shows ANFSP can converge in
a shorter time and the convergence is more stable compared with NFSP. Finally
we tested the algorithm in FPS games, and it achieved superhuman results in
short time, it shows the combination of Monte Carlo Tree Search and NFSP is
a practical way to solve imperfect-information game problems.
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